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The cognitivist account of meaning and the liar paradox 
Mark Pinder 
 
This paper is forthcoming in Philosophical Studies. The final publication will be available at Springer 
via <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0345-5>. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A number of theorists hold that literal, linguistic meaning is determined by the cognitive mechanism 
that underpins semantic competence. Let us call this view the cognitivist account of meaning (or 
simply cognitivism). In this paper, I discuss a surprisingly serious difficulty that cognitivism faces in 
light of the liar paradox.  
 My focus is on the form of cognitivism developed extensively by, for example, Emma Borg 
(2004, 2012) and Richard Larson and Gabriel Segal (1995). Such authors build into cognitivism a 
particular view about semantic competence: that it is underpinned by the speaker’s cognition of a 
truth-conditional semantic theory, of the general form advocated by Davidson (1967). Such a 
semantic theory is a recursively axiomatised formal theory that contains axioms assigning semantic 
values to each lexical item of the object language and axioms assigning semantic values to complex 
expressions on the basis of their constituents and mode of composition. For each sentence, X, of the 
object language, the semantic theory yields a T-sentence, a theorem of the form “X is true if, and only 
if, p”.1 I shall say that a T-sentence is correct if the sentence replacing “p” states the condition under 
which X is true; it follows that a correct T-sentence is true. For ease, I shall hereafter reserve the term 
“semantic theory” for semantic theories of this general form; and I shall say that such a semantic 
theory is correct just in case its axioms are true and it yields only correct T-sentences. 
It is contentious exactly what cognition of a semantic theory amounts to. However, one way 
or another, to say that a speaker cognises a semantic theory is to make a substantive, empirical claim 
about the cognitive mechanisms that underpin her semantic competence. The rough idea is that 
speakers possess a modular language faculty that includes a dedicated semantic module, and that a 
given speaker cognises a semantic theory T just in case her semantic module realises, encodes, 
processes, or stands in some other suitable relation to, T. Whatever the details, there is no presumption 
that cognition is factive: to say that a speaker cognises T is not thereby to say that T is true. Let us call 
this view of semantic competence the neo-Davidsonian account of semantic competence. For Borg, 
and Larson and Segal, this cognitive mechanism determines linguistic meaning: the cognised semantic 
theory is correct. 
                                                          
1
 I largely put aside the issue of context sensitivity in this paper, taking it up principally in §4.1 to discuss 
Burge’s indexicalist account of truth. 
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I shall argue that, so understood, cognitivism faces a surprisingly serious difficulty in light of 
the liar paradox. Consider the liar sentence λ: 
 
λ is not true. 
 
Without loss of generality, we can treat λ as a sentence of English – perhaps, for example, by treating 
the letter “λ” as an abbreviation of the definite description: 
 
the first centrally aligned sentence in the paper “the cognitivist 
account of meaning and the liar paradox”. 
 
Intuitively, λ is a subject-predicate sentence whose subject denotes λ, and whose predicate is satisfied 
by whatever is not true. As such, we might initially expect the following to be the T-sentence for λ: 
 
(Tλ) “λ is not true” is true if, and only if, λ is not true. 
 
However, (Tλ) implies a contradiction (by substitution of co-referring terms and by considering 
cases). So, on pain of inconsistency, it seems that (Tλ) must be rejected. 
 The potential difficulty for the cognitivist is clear. If it turns out that speakers cognise a 
semantic theory that has the T-sentence (Tλ) amongst its theorems, then the cognitivist would seem to 
be committed to (Tλ) being correct. That is, the cognitivist would seem to be committed to (Tλ) being 
true. Given that (Tλ) is inconsistent, this would be a serious problem. 
Once I have said a little more about the cognitivist account of meaning (§2), I shall provide 
(§3) an argument for the claim that, assuming the neo-Davidsonian account of semantic competence, 
ordinary speakers do cognise a semantic theory that includes (Tλ) amongst its theorems. I shall then 
(§4) discuss a number of lines of response, drawing out some of the difficulties facing each response, 
before concluding (§5). 
 It should be made clear before we begin that the difficulty cannot simply be brushed aside. 
First, it will not do for the cognitivist to simply reject the neo-Davidsonian account of semantic 
competence. The account is at the heart of perhaps the most extensively worked out form of 
cognitivism – that of Borg, and Larson and Segal – , and it would be a major, and highly unwelcome, 
concession to admit that this form of cognitivism is inconsistent. Moreover, it is not clear to me that 
the concession would be methodologically sound: it is an empirical question about our cognitive 
make-up whether the neo-Davidsonian account of semantic competence is correct, and we should not 
reject it just because it might not be straightforwardly combined with an account of linguistic 
meaning. Of course, there may be independent reasons to deny the neo-Davidsonian account of 
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semantic competence.
2 I do not think, however, that empirical accounts of the cognitive mechanisms 
that underpin semantic competence draw evidential support from their facilitating a solution to the liar 
paradox; so we should not reject such an account on the basis of the paradox. 
Second, it is a purely empirical matter what the theorems of the cognised semantic theory are. 
And, in particular, it is a purely empirical matter whether a cognised semantic theory has (Tλ) amongst 
its theorems. If a cognised semantic theory is to do real explanatory work, it may not simply be 
stipulated that it, say, encodes a solution to the liar paradox. A theorist’s preferred solution to the 
paradox may not simply be ‘read back’ into the cognitive mechanism that underpins semantic 
competence. 
Third, the discussion here is likely to generalise. It is the particular way that the cognitivist 
ties linguistic meaning to the cognitive mechanism underlying some of our linguistic dispositions that 
causes difficulties in relation to the liar paradox. But there are other accounts of meaning that tie 
meaning to linguistic dispositions, such as views that ground meaning in speakers’ dispositional states 
(e.g. Field 1977), speakers’ causal states (e.g. Davies 1987, Evans 1981), and some hypothetical 
process of radical interpretation (e.g. Davidson 1973). If the liar paradox poses a serious difficulty to 
cognitivism, then it likewise poses a serious difficulty to a whole range of empirically-minded 
accounts of meaning. It is worth getting clear on the full extent of the difficulty posed by the liar 
paradox to cognitivism. 
 
2. Background and terminology 
 
Let me begin by clarifying a few terms. First, a speaker’s semantic competence is her idealised 
capacity to interpret each of the lexical items, complex expressions and sentences of her language.
3
 
There is no built-in assumption that the speaker’s interpretation is correct. (And, thus, it may not 
simply be assumed that semantic competence is just a matter of knowing what linguistic expressions 
mean.) An account of semantic competence is, then, an empirical hypothesis about how the cognitive 
make-up of speakers is such that speakers have semantic competence. According to the neo-
Davidsonian account of semantic competence, speakers possess a semantic module, whose inputs, 
processes and outputs in some way mirror a particular semantic theory.
4
 That is, for the neo-
Davidsonian, semantic competence is underpinned by the cognition of a semantic theory (of the 
                                                          
2
 See e.g. Chomsky 2000, Pietroski 2003. See also Laurence 1996 for a brand of cognitivism that does not 
incorporate the neo-Davidsonian account.  
3
 Cf. Chomsky’s distinction between competence and performance. See e.g. Chomsky 1965: 4. 
4
 Different theorists employ different conceptions of modularity here. For Borg, this module is a genuine 
Fodorian module (characterised in particular by domain specificity and informational encapsulation); see Borg 
2004: 74ff, and Fodor 1983. Larson and Segal, however, prefer a weaker understanding of modularity (1995: 
557-558n23). 
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general form put forward by Davidson). Throughout this paper I shall assume the neo-Davidsonian 
account of semantic competence for the sake of argument.
5
 
 Cognitivism, in contrast, is a view about linguistic meaning. In particular, it is the view that 
the cognitive mechanism that underpins semantic competence determines meaning. For example, 
Borg tells us that 
 
an interpretation is the right/wrong one if it matches/fails to match the one generated by 
the semantic theory actually [cognised] by ordinary speakers. (2010: 35) 
 
Similarly, Larson and Segal (1995) construe the task of providing an account of meaning as 
“specify[ing] precisely the contents of the semantics module” (p.23), where the module in question 
“underlie[s] our grasp of semantic facts” (p.25, my emphasis). 
 There is an ambiguity here to note. Consider the claim that the cognitive mechanism that 
underpins semantic competence determines meaning. Is this a metaphysical notion of determination? 
That is, does the cognitivist claim that the cognitive mechanism that underpins semantic competence 
metaphysically determines, or grounds, linguistic meaning? Cognitivists sometimes seem to suggest 
so. For one example, Borg states that: 
 
[w]hat makes “grass is green” mean that grass is green is that this is the content delivered 
by the semantic theory contained within a subject’s language faculty; grounding is thus 
achieved by appeal to contents of the mind. (2010: 35, my emphasis)
6
 
 
If we understand determination with this metaphysical flavour, then we obtain a version of 
cognitivism along the following lines. 
 
Metaphysical cognitivism: the cognised semantic theory is correct, and it is correct in 
virtue of its being cognised. 
 
However, there is no requirement to understand determination in this way. For example, when we say 
that a calculator ‘determines’ the correct answer to a sum, we certainly do not suggest that the 
correctness of the answer is grounded by the contents of the calculator. Rather, we suggest just that 
the calculator gets the answer right. If we understand determination in this way, then we obtain a 
weaker version of cognitivism, as follows. 
                                                          
5
 See my comments in §1 about why we should not reject the neo-Davidsonian account in response to the liar 
paradox. 
6
 See also e.g. Segal 1999: 56, and Borg 2012: 55. 
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Material cognitivism: the cognised semantic theory is correct. 
 
So, to be explicit, metaphysical cognitivism implies material cognitivism, but the converse is not true. 
We shall find the distinction useful from time to time in what follows – but I shall use “cognitivism” 
when the distinction is not important. 
 Both metaphysical and material cognitivism, as just characterised, imply that the cognised 
semantic theory is correct. I have formulated the view in this way as, to my mind at least, it best 
captures the view developed by Borg and Larson and Segal. But it is worth noting that one could in 
principle understand determination differently: one could maintain that the cognitive mechanism that 
underpins semantic competence determines linguistic meaning, in the sense that the cognised 
semantic theory T fixes what expressions and sentences mean, but hold that T does not determine 
meaning directly, in the sense that facts about meaning cannot be directly read off T. This sort of view 
need not be committed to the cognised semantic theory being correct. Thus, for example, in response 
to the liar paradox, the cognitivist may attempt to restrict which of the cognised T-sentences correctly 
specify the truth conditions of the relevant sentences. I shall consider and criticise such views in §4.2. 
Alternatively, the cognitivist might deny that facts about meaning can be directly read off the 
cognised semantic theory because she denies that linguistic meaning is truth-conditional. Perhaps, for 
example, she could argue that linguistic meaning is not representational, or that it requires substantial 
input from context to obtain truth conditions.
7
 It is an interesting and important question whether the 
considerations I raise in the present paper extend to such views, but not one I shall consider here. For 
the moment I merely note that the problem with such an approach is that we are assuming the neo-
Davidsonian account of semantic competence; and the view that meaning is determined by the 
cognition of a (truth-conditional) semantic theory seems in tension with the claim that meaning is not 
truth-conditional. First, the view would be rather incongruous: our semantic competence would 
involve the assignment of truth conditions to sentences, even though the meaning thereby determined 
would not be truth-conditional. Second, it is simply unclear how the (sometimes incorrect) assignment 
of truth conditions to sentences made by the cognised theory could determine such non-truth-
conditional meanings. Once the cognitive mechanism has assigned a truth condition to a sentence, it is 
unclear how to get back something other than a truth condition. For these reasons, I shall assume 
throughout this paper that sentence meaning is truth-conditional.
8
 
  There is a second strategy for denying that the cognised semantic theory needs to be correct. 
Consider how, on some readings of Davidson, a (truth-conditional) semantic theory is intended to do 
                                                          
7
 See e.g. Chomsky 2000 and Pietroski 2003 for the first possibility and Carston 2008 for the second. 
8
 Although, see my comments in §4.2 about ‘thin-meaning’. For an extended defence of the claim that meaning 
is truth-conditional, see Borg 2012: 73–111. 
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duty for intensional linguistic notions by, in effect, doing their explanatory work.
9
 Perhaps one could 
construe the cognitivist account of meaning along similar lines – the aim being to use facts about the 
cognitive mechanism that underpins semantic competence to undertake the theoretical work done by 
traditional theories of meaning. On such a view, it may not matter whether the cognised theory is true 
or false. Now, I am sceptical that such a view captures the claim that the cognitive mechanism in 
question determines meaning; if anything, it rather suggests that, contrary to what Borg and Larson 
and Segal seem to think, meaning is explanatorily superfluous and might be eliminated. But, 
nonetheless, it certainly appears to be a view in the same ballpark as cognitivism. For this reason, I 
shall consider (in §4.2) a view along these lines that has been put defended by Douglas Patterson 
(2009). I take it that my comments about Patterson’s account will carry over to other views along 
these lines.
10
 In the meantime, however, I assume that the cognitivist is committed to linguistic 
expressions being meaningful, in the sense that words have referents, predicates have extensions, and 
sentences have truth conditions. 
 
3. The liar paradox and the inconsistency hypothesis 
 
Pre-reflectively, we might expect the truth condition for λ – where λ is the sentence “λ is not true” – to 
be represented by (Tλ), reprinted here for ease of reference: 
 
(Tλ) “λ is not true” is true if, and only if, λ is not true. 
 
However, (Tλ) is inconsistent (by substitution of co-referring terms and by considering cases), and 
should presumably thus be rejected.
11
 
 Consider now what the inconsistency of (Tλ) tells us about correct semantic theories. As (Tλ) 
is inconsistent, it cannot accurately represent the truth condition actually possessed by λ (if, indeed, λ 
possesses any truth condition at all). So (Tλ) cannot be yielded by any correct semantic theory, as 
correct semantic theories are true. Can a similar point be made with regard to cognised semantic 
theories? No. Whereas correct semantic theories need to be true, a cognised semantic theory needs 
just to play the relevant role in an empirical story about a speaker’s cognitive make-up. And there is 
no a priori reason to suppose that the relevant role must be played by a consistent semantic theory.
12
 
                                                          
9
 See e.g. Ludwig 2002, Lepore and Ludwig 2005, and Badici and Ludwig 2007. 
10
 See e.g. Gross 2006. 
11
 For now, I put aside various attempts – such as, notably, Field 2008, and dialetheism – to save such T-
sentences through the adoption of a non-classical logic.  
12
 For more details, see Pinder forthcoming: §2. Cf. Gross 2006: 59-68.  
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So, (Tλ) can be yielded by a cognised semantic theory. And, as we have seen, contrary to cognitivism, 
such a semantic theory would not be correct. 
 I shall shortly raise an argument for the hypothesis that, in fact, cognised semantic theories do 
yield such T-sentences as (Tλ). More precisely, I shall raise an argument for the inconsistency 
hypothesis, as follows. 
 
The inconsistency hypothesis: the cognised semantic theory is inconsistent, as it yields an 
inconsistent T-sentence (such as (Tλ)) for a liar sentence (such as λ).
13,14
 
 
If the inconsistency hypothesis is true, then cognitivism – at least as characterised above – is false. I 
consider a number of lines of response to the difficulty in the following section. 
 The argument proceeds by a consideration of a variety of linguistic data. How can linguistic 
data be used to draw conclusions about the cognised semantic theory? In general, a speaker lacks 
epistemic access to the inner workings of the semantic module. But its outputs are supposedly the 
literal meanings of sentences. It is for this reason that, for example, Borg states that 
 
[g]iven the right context (i.e. one where subjects are asked to reflect on ‘literal’ or ‘strict’ 
meaning) ordinary interlocutors can and do grasp exactly the kinds of contents [the 
cognitivist account] predicts. We are all used to the sarcastic or uncooperative response to 
something we have said which picks up not on obvious features of the conveyed content 
but instead insists on the minimal, literal interpretation of our words. (2012: 14-15) 
 
Similarly, Larson and Segal tell us that 
 
the notion of the literal meaning of an expression is replaced by that of the semantic 
properties ascribed to the expression by the [cognised semantic theory]. Thus, when a 
speaker utters an indicative sentence and intends to speak literally, the meaning the 
speaker intends to convey will be the truth conditions his or her [cognised semantic 
theory] ascribes to the sentence. The story is similar for when a hearer hears a sentence. 
(1995: 53)  
 
                                                          
13
 Douglas Patterson (2009) makes a similar hypothesis. He does not, however, present explicit arguments or 
evidence for the hypothesis, but rather offers it as a solution to the liar paradox. I shall consider his view as a 
possible line of response for the cognitivist in §4.2.  
14
 In saying the cognised theory is inconsistent I do not insist that the theory yields an explicit contradiction; I 
allow that an additional true premise (such as: λ = “λ is not true”) might also be required. 
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The idea, then, is that the T-sentences of the cognised semantic are expected to correspond reasonably 
well to the intuitive conception of literal meaning. As such, from the current perspective, we might 
hope to use linguistic data to formulate direct hypotheses about which T-sentences are yielded by the 
cognised semantic theory. Now, a full discussion of the linguistic data is beyond the scope of this 
paper; but we can nonetheless build at least a prima facie case in support of the inconsistency 
hypothesis. Consider the following four pieces of linguistic data. 
 First, consider the following, intuitively valid inference.  
 
(1) λ is not true. 
(2) “Grass is blue” is not true. 
(3) The liar sentence and “Grass is blue” are distinct sentences. 
Therefore: 
(4) There are at least two sentences that are not true. 
 
The intuitive validity of the inference from (1)–(3) to (4) rests on the fact that it is apparently an 
instance of the valid argument form: 
 
(1′) a is not F. 
(2′) b is not F. 
(3′) a and b are distinct Gs. 
Therefore: 
(4′) There are at least two Gs that are not F. 
 
If this is right, then, on its natural reading, it seems that premise (1) has truth-conditional content of 
the form of (1′) – and thus, plausibly, content of the form of that λ is not true. 
 Second, liar sentences can be embedded within logical operators to yield intuitively true 
sentences. To set up the example, note that we can characterise the ‘revenge problem’ as a problem 
facing potential solutions to the liar paradox that do not imply that λ is true: the problem is that such 
solutions lead naturally to the meta-theoretic assertion of “λ is not true”, seemingly implying that “λ is 
not true” is true after all. Consider now the following. 
 
(5)  If λ is not true, then an adequate solution to the liar paradox will have to resolve the ‘revenge 
problem’. 
 
Sentence (5) is, I think, intuitively true: a prima facie ‘revenge problem’ will arise for any solution 
that, as apparently expressed by the antecedent, deems λ untrue. As such, on the intuitive reading of 
(5), it seems that the antecedent of (5) has truth-conditional content that λ is not true. 
9 
 
 Third, it seems that, when liar sentences are uttered, there is non-cancellable content. 
Suppose, for example, that Sara is teaching a course on the paradoxes and has written just the 
following on the whiteboard: 
 
The sentence on the whiteboard is not true. 
 
(Note that this is obtained by taking “λ” to be an abbreviation of “the sentence on the whiteboard”.) 
Suppose that Sara says that, in her opinion, the sentence on the whiteboard is not true; this results in a 
student asking whether the sentence on the whiteboard needs to be learnt for the exam. Suppose that 
Sara responds by uttering (6). 
 
(6) The sentence on the whiteboard is not true. 
 
Plausibly, by uttering (6) in this context, Sara conveys that the sentence need not be learnt for the 
exam. Suppose now that she continues by uttering one of the following. 
 
(7) … but you still need to learn it for the exam. 
(8) … and it’s not the case that the sentence on the whiteboard is not true. 
 
Intuitively, Sara would not contradict her utterance of (6) in uttering (7), but she would contradict her 
utterance of (6) in uttering (8). This provides initial evidence that Sara’s utterance of the liar sentence 
has non-cancellable content that λ is not true – and, more generally, perhaps, that utterances of “λ is 
not true” have non-cancellable content that λ is not true. This constitutes evidence that “λ is not true” 
has literal truth conditional content that λ is not true. 
Fourth, there is evidence to suggest that liar sentences are not context sensitive.
15
 For 
example, suppose that, at t, Mike utters the following. 
 
(9) What Mike says at t is not true. 
 
And suppose that, a little later, John utters (10). 
 
(10) What Mike said at t was not true. 
 
                                                          
15
 See Cappelen and Lepore 2005 and Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009 respectively for recent defences of the 
tests I employ below. I should note that Borg (2012: 31-32) is critical of using such tests for establishing context 
sensitivity; failing the tests, however, plausibly remains good evidence for the absence of context sensitivity. 
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Then, bypassing any complications involving tense, Mike’s utterance of (9) and John’s utterance of 
(10) can intuitively be reported correctly (in our context) as follows. 
 
(11) Mike and John said that what Mike said at t was not true. 
(12) Mike and John agree that what Mike said at t was not true. 
 
Given the robustness of the intuition that reports such as (11) and (12) are correct (the reader is 
invited to test further cases), this is initial evidence that, on the natural readings of such liar sentences, 
there is no context sensitivity. 
 The above data constitutes initial evidence that speakers are disposed to assign to λ the literal, 
context-insensitive, truth-conditional content that λ is not true. And, in the present context, it 
constitutes initial evidence that the cognised semantic theory yields the T-sentence (Tλ) – and that the 
inconsistency hypothesis is thereby correct. The data provided here is certainly not conclusive: our 
linguistic intuitions are underpinned by a variety of interlinked cognitive mechanisms, and it is far 
from being clear cut precisely what a particular set of data tells us about those mechanisms. This 
being said, however, it is very natural to interpret the above data as supporting the inconsistency 
hypothesis – and insofar as this is case, they provide some reason to think – albeit tentatively – that 
the inconsistency hypothesis is correct.  
That, then, is the difficulty posed to the cognitivist account of meaning by the liar paradox. 
Cognitivism states that the cognised semantic theory is correct; but there is reason to think that, as a 
result of the liar paradox, the cognised semantic theory is inconsistent. As correctness implies truth, 
the inconsistency of the cognised semantic theory directly contradicts cognitivism.  
 
4. Lines of response 
 
Let us now turn to discuss a number of lines that the cognitivist might take in response to the 
difficulty posed by the liar paradox. To help keep the dialectic clear, the lines of response are divided 
into two main groups, according to whether they deny the inconsistency hypothesis, or deny that the 
truth of the inconsistency hypothesis would be a problem for cognitivism. 
 
4.1 “The inconsistency hypothesis is false” 
 
In this subsection, I discuss three lines of response. The first is that the inconsistency hypothesis must 
be false for the neo-Davidsonian account of semantic competence to make sense. The second is that, 
the argument in the previous section notwithstanding, the cognised semantic theory is consistent. In 
particular, I shall consider the hypothesis that, in line with a well-known solution to the liar paradox 
offered by Tyler Burge (1979), the natural language truth predicate is an indexical. The third line of 
11 
 
response I consider is more radical: that the cognised semantic theory may indeed yield a T-sentence 
like (Tλ), but revisions to logic and the semantics of conditionals block the derivation of a 
contradiction. 
First, then, the cognitivist might initially be tempted to argue that the inconsistency 
hypothesis must be false: the neo-Davidsonian account of semantic competence, she might claim, 
requires the cognised semantic theory to be consistent. Perhaps, so goes the thought, if an individual 
were to cognise an inconsistent semantic theory, then her semantic module would have to implement 
a ‘faulty program’, leading to the failure of the semantic module to operate effectively. Arguments 
along these lines, however, are unlikely to succeed. 
 An account of semantic competence must explain how a speaker’s cognitive make-up is such 
that she can interpret the words, complex expressions and sentences of her language. The neo-
Davidsonian account of semantic competence can do this straightforwardly regardless of the 
consistency of the cognised semantic theory. To see why, let us first introduce the notion of a 
canonical derivation procedure.
16
 (For ease of exposition, here, I focus just on sentences.) A 
canonical derivation procedure is a recursive algorithm with which a semantic theory for a language, 
L, is equipped. The algorithm tells us which inferential steps are taken in deriving the T-sentence for 
each sentence of L from the axioms for the constituents of that sentence and their mode of 
composition. We might then make the following claim about cognition. A speaker cognises a 
particular semantic theory for L, TL, when: her semantic module takes, as input, representations of 
sentences of L; the module implements the canonical derivation procedure of TL, processing inputs to 
yield, as outputs, T-sentences of input sentences. 
 Now, an inconsistent semantic theory can have a canonical derivation procedure in precisely 
the same way as a consistent semantic theory: the procedure, given an input (representation of a) 
sentence, recursively yields an interpretation for that sentence. For any given line in a particular 
canonical derivation, the procedure provides a unique next line in the derivation – regardless of the 
truth or consistency of any preceding lines in the derivation. That one can classically derive anything 
from a contradiction is irrelevant; only canonically derivable theorems of the semantic theory are 
relevant to interpretation, and only canonically derivable theorems represent outputs of the semantic 
module. A semantic theory that yields (Tλ), and is thereby inconsistent, may nonetheless have a 
perfectly coherent canonical derivation procedure. Cognition of an inconsistent, semantic theory may 
consequently underpin semantic competence. As far as the neo-Davidsonian account of semantic 
competence is concerned, the inconsistency hypothesis might be true. 
 It is not the case, then, that the cognised semantic theory must be consistent. The second line 
of response that I shall consider, however, says that the cognised semantic theory, regardless of the 
above, is consistent. To push this line, the cognitivist would have to do two things: first, she would 
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 See e.g. Larson and Segal 1995: 34–37. 
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have to cast doubt on the argument for the inconsistency hypothesis presented in §3; second, she 
would have to present contrary data – or a contrary interpretation of the same data – to support the 
conclusion that cognised semantic theory is consistent.  
Let us fix the idea with a concrete example (although, to be clear, the difficulties I shall 
subsequently raise do generalise). Suppose, then, that the cognitivist proceeds by seeking evidence 
that the natural language truth predicate is in fact an indexical, as proposed by Burge (1979).
17
 She 
might then argue that the tests for context sensitivity employed in §3 failed to indicate this 
indexicality because the relevant context parameter has the same value in each of the contexts of 
utterance for (9)–(12). Then she could conclude that the T-sentence for λ yielded by the cognised 
semantic theory is: 
 
(Tλ′) “λ is not true” (as uttered in c) is TRUE if, and only if, λ is not true-in-c 
 
where the capitalised truth predicate is given a context-insensitive reading. So long as there is no 
value of c for which, in c, λ falls in the extension of “true-in-c”, contradiction is avoided. 
 I am not sure how likely it is that the cognitivist will find strong evidence to support the 
hypothesis that the cognised semantic theory yields (Tλ′). There is certainly no obvious reason why 
the cognised semantic theory would treat the natural language truth predicate as context sensitive: the 
expressive function of the truth predicate appears not to require it to be context sensitive. What is the 
expressive function of the truth predicate?
 
Arguably, it is to facilitate blind assertion (“whatever your 
mother just told you, it’s true”), infinite generalisation (“everything the Oracle says is true”), 
agreement (“yes, that’s true”), anaphora (“Cameron is the prime minister. True, but …”), etc.18 All of 
these functions, however, are most simply achieved by allowing sentences of the form “…” and “‘…’ 
is true” to be straightforwardly intersubstitutable, salva veritate, in transparent contexts – which 
would indicate that the natural language truth predicate is context insensitive. And, on the assumption 
that we would expect our cognitive mechanisms to tend towards a minimisation of spurious 
inefficiency, we should thus expect the cognised semantic theory to treat the truth predicate as context 
insensitive. 
 But suppose that, nonetheless, the cognitivist does find evidence that the cognised semantic 
theory yields (Tλ′). Even then, it seems that it very easily could have been the case that we had 
cognised a semantic theory that yields (Tλ). Our linguistic behaviour need not have been different in 
                                                          
17
 There are other views in the literature according to which the liar paradox arises due to context sensitivity, but 
that do not treat the truth predicate as an indexical. For reasons of space, I cannot discuss them here. See e.g. 
Glanzberg 2001, 2004, and Parsons 1974.  
18
 Cf. the literature on deflationary theories of truth, e.g. Horwich 2010. (Note that one can accept the above 
comments without being a deflationist.) 
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any relevant respect, and there need have been no substantial difference between the the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying that behaviour; but there could have been a small difference in the details of 
our neurological wiring, so to speak, such that the cognised semantic theory had yielded (Tλ) and such 
that our pragmatic mechanisms had been slightly adjusted to compensate for the difference. There 
would then be two worlds – w1 and w2, say – such that: the linguistic behaviour of the people in each 
world would be the same in the relevant respects;
19
 the kind of cognitive mechanisms that underpin 
the linguistic behaviour would be the same in each world; and the speakers in w1 just happen to 
cognise a consistent semantic theory, whereas the speakers in w2 just happen to cognise an 
inconsistent semantic theory. While one may claim that cognitivism is true in w1, one may not claim 
that cognitivism is true in w2.
20
 This, however, is a problem. 
 Let me explain. Take the metaphysical variant of cognitivism first. Suppose that the 
metaphysical cognitivist claims that, in w1, the cognised semantic theory, in virtue of its being 
cognised, is correct. What can she say about linguistic meaning in w2? Given that the linguistic 
behaviour of people in w1 and w2 is in the relevant respects the same, and given that the linguistic 
behaviour is underpinned by just the same kind of cognitive mechanisms, we would not like to 
conclude that linguistic expressions in w2 are meaningless. But, as the metaphysical cognitivist’s 
metaphysical story is only available in w1, she would thus be committed to there being a different 
metaphysical story in w2. This, however, would be a bizarre situation: speakers’ linguistic behaviour, 
the kind of mechanisms that underpin that behaviour, the external environment, the laws of nature, 
etc., may be the same in w1 as in w2, but the fundamental metaphysical picture of meaning in the two 
worlds would be different. But what could justify this difference? The metaphysical cognitivist would 
owe us an explanation, and it is not clear how one would be given. 
 Consider now material cognitivism.
21
 It might be claimed that material cognitivism is true in 
w1, but false in w2. Moreover, the material cognitivist may grant that a single (non-cognitivist) 
metaphysical story may be told about meaning in both w1 and w2. However, now we would like to ask 
the material cognitivist: why is the metaphysics of meaning such that, in w1 but not w2, the cognitive 
mechanisms that underpin semantic competence track whatever facts there are about meaning? The 
problem here is that all of the factors that appear to be relevant to the answer are ostensibly the same 
in w1 as in w2: the linguistic behaviour is underpinned by precisely the same kind of cognitive 
mechanism in both worlds, and ex hypothesi the metaphysical story about meaning is the same in both 
                                                          
19
 What are the relevant respects? I mean that speakers in w1 and w2 would not notice anything unusual in the 
linguistic behaviour of the speakers in w2 and w1 respectively. 
20
 I consider lines of response that deny that the truth of the inconsistency hypothesis is a problem for 
cognitivism in §4.2.  
21
 Additional concerns are raised in Pinder forthcoming: §3. 
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worlds. So what could justify material cognitivism in one world but not the other? The material 
cognitivist would owe us an explanation but, as before, it is not clear how one would be given. 
Let us, then, turn to the third line of response that I shall consider. The cognitivist might look 
to adopt a solution to the liar paradox that endorses a T-sentence: 
 
(Tλ′′) “λ is not true” is true ↔ λ is not true, 
 
but involves a revision of logic and the introduction of a non-standard conditional (whose associated 
biconditional I represent with “↔”) to block the subsequent derivation of a contradiction.22 The idea 
for the cognitivist would be roughly as follows: the cognised semantic theory yields the T-sentence 
(Tλ′′) for λ; the logic and conditional are such that the derivation of an explicit contradiction from 
(Tλ′′) is blocked; thus, even given the premise that λ = “λ is not true”, the cognised semantic theory is 
consistent and may coherently be deemed correct. 
 Whatever merits such a theory of truth has, the cognitivist cannot adopt it as straightforwardly 
as she might hope. The cognitivist would have to argue that the output of the semantic module, given 
(a representation of) λ as input, is (Tλ′′) as opposed to (Tλ). Notice that this is not obviously a 
substantial change of commitment in terms of the meaning of λ: both T-sentences might be said to 
characterise λ as having the truth-condition that λ is not true. It is, in the first instance, the logic and 
the conditional of the metalanguage that have been changed. However, this is a substantial 
commitment: the semantic theory that yields (Tλ′′) is a different semantic theory to that which yields 
(Tλ). And, as Larson and Segal tell us,  
 
[…] what semantic theory a person knows is a question for science, a matter of 
determinate empirical fact. This means that even if we discover a number of interpretive 
T theories, all successfully predicting the various kinds of speaker judgments discussed 
above, at most one of these can be the theory actually internalized by the speaker. (1995: 
56–7) 
 
The challenge for the cognitivist, then, is to explain why we should think that the relevant output of 
the semantic module is (Tλ′′) as opposed to (Tλ). 
 How the cognitivist might attempt to meet this challenge is an interesting question that I 
cannot discuss in any detail here. But let me express a general concern that I have about the prospects 
for meeting the challenge. Arguably the most developed solution to the liar paradox along the lines 
                                                          
22
 Field’s (2008) paracomplete theory of truth is an important and highly sophisticated example: it involves the 
adoption of a third truth value, and the semantics for its conditional are given by a transfinitely-iterated revision 
procedure which need not concern us here. 
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discussed here is that of Field (2008). Consider now the following four points. First, Field’s theory or 
truth is significantly more sophisticated, subtle and intricate than a straightforwardly inconsistent 
semantic theory that yields (Tλ). Second, a principal strength of Field’s solution is that it validates the 
intersubstitutability of “…” and “‘…’ is true”, and by the logical strength of the resulting system (cf. 
McGee 2010: 422f). Third, all else being equal, and given the high costs of cognitive resources, we 
would expect there to be a preference for the cognised semantic theory to be simple, rather than 
sophisticated, subtle and intricate. Fourth, neither the valid intersubstitutability of “…” and “‘…’ is 
true”, nor the logical strength of Field’s system, are even relevant to the question of which semantic 
theory is cognised: the function of the semantic module is to interpret the words, complex expressions 
and sentences of the speaker’s language, and, given the availability of canonical derivation procedures 
for inconsistent semantic theories, issues of validity and logical strength are beside the point. The 
upshot is that, even if the cognitivist explains how the relevant output of the semantic module is (Tλ′′) 
as opposed to (Tλ), there is unlikely to be any reason to think that the relevant output actually is (Tλ′′) 
rather than (Tλ). The incorporation into the cognised semantic module of any such (non-classical) 
solution to the liar paradox constitutes a substantial empirical hypothesis that, it seems, there would be 
little reason to endorse.  
 We now turn to responses that seek to deny that the truth of the inconsistency hypothesis 
would be a problem for cognitivism. 
 
4.2 “The truth of the inconsistency hypothesis would not be a problem” 
 
Suppose that the inconsistency hypothesis is true: the cognised semantic theory yields (Tλ), from 
which a contradiction can be derived. Given this supposition, how might the cognitivist respond? In 
this subsection, I shall consider three options: the inconsistency theories put forward by Douglas 
Patterson (2009, 2012) and Matti Eklund (2002, 2005), and then the adoption of a broadly Kripkean 
(1975) approach to the liar paradox.  
Before I begin, however, let me very briefly mention dialetheism.
23
 The cognitivist may 
accept that, despite being inconsistent, (Tλ) is in fact true. On this view, it follows that both λ is true 
and λ is not true; triviality may be avoided by commitment to a nonclassical, paraconsistent logic that 
deems ex falso quodlibet invalid. My main concern about this line of response is the independent 
coherence and plausibility of dialetheism – a matter that has been discussed at length elsewhere, and 
that I shall not discuss here.
24
 But I note that, if the cognitivist is forced to adopt dialetheism, this 
would constitute a significant increase in the logical and metaphysical baggage that accompanies 
cognitivism. In what follows, I put dialetheism aside. 
                                                          
23
 See e.g. Priest 2006. 
24
 See e.g. the papers in Priest, Beall and Armour-Garb 2005. 
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 So let us consider so-called “inconsistency theories”. Very roughly, the inconsistency theorist 
claims in response to the liar paradox that our understanding of natural language is, in one way or 
another, inconsistent. I will focus first on Douglas Patterson’s (2009, 2012) inconsistency theory, and 
then on that of Matti Eklund (2002, 2005).
25
 Patterson’s inconsistency theory involves a commitment 
to the neo-Davidsonian account of semantic competence and, in essence, our inconsistency 
hypothesis. He claims that 
 
understanding a natural language is sharing with other speakers cognition of a truth 
conditional semantic theory for that language which the paradoxes show to be logically 
false. (2009: 413) 
 
He draws the somewhat surprising conclusion that all of the sentences of natural language lack truth 
conditions and are meaningless. The idea is that we should make do with just the neo-Davidsonian 
account of semantic competence, and attempt to explain the relevant linguistic phenomena without 
recourse to linguistic meaning.  
 Now, it should be understood that adopting Patterson’s inconsistency theory is tantamount to 
denying cognitivism. Patterson accepts the neo-Davidsonian account of semantic competence and 
denies that the semantic module (or anything else) determines meaning. For this reason, to claim that 
one should adopt Patterson’s inconsistency theory in response to the liar paradox would be to claim 
(in part) that cognitivism should be rejected in response to the liar paradox. A cognitivist cannot adopt 
Patterson’s inconsistency theory without thereby ceasing to be a cognitivist. 
 Nonetheless, Patterson’s inconsistency theory retains something of the spirit of cognitivism. 
Both Patterson and the cognitivist take the neo-Davidsonian account of semantic competence to play a 
principal role in explanations of linguistic phenomena: for the cognitivist, the neo-Davidsonian 
account of semantic competence gives us the correct semantic theory, which can then be deployed to 
explain various linguistic data, the learnability of language, etc.; for Patterson, such explanations 
appeal to the neo-Davidsonian account of semantic competence directly. Perhaps, then, the adoption 
of Patterson’s inconsistency theory would be a concession that, in light of the liar paradox, the 
cognitivist is willing to make. 
 I have two points of caution. First, it is far from clear that the neo-Davidsonian account of 
semantic competence can do the relevant the explanatory work.
26
 That is, it is far from clear that 
Patterson can explain all of the relevant linguistic phenomena without recourse to linguistic meaning. 
                                                          
25
 I shall not discuss Kevin Scharp’s (2013a,b) inconsistency theory, which is perhaps the most sophisticated in 
the literature: it seems that the cognitivist may not adopt Scharp’s view as Scharp is required to explicitly deny 
that a semantic theory (as he envisages it) might have cognitive reality. See his 2013b: 459f. 
26
 Matti Eklund raises a similar worry in his 2007: 571–572. 
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For example, it is plausibly a linguistic phenomenon that, in English, one does not make a mistake in 
drawing inferences according to some rules: 
 
(P) X and Y 
Therefore: 
(C) X, 
 
while one does make a mistake in drawing inferences according to others: 
 
(P1) If X, then Y 
(P2) Y 
Therefore: 
(C) X. 
 
There is a natural explanation of this phenomenon: some rules, including the first but not the second, 
are valid. However, insofar as we think that validity is a matter of truth preservation, this explanation 
presupposes that the sentences in question have truth conditions and meanings, and thus appears not 
to be available to Patterson. If the cognitivist is to follow this line of response, she should show how 
one can explain such phenomena without an account of meaning. 
 Second, it is far from clear that the cognitivist should adopt Patterson’s inconsistency theory 
as a response to the liar paradox. To see why, let us first distinguish between two questions that we 
might ask: 
 
(Q1) Is the cognised semantic theory consistent? 
(Q2) Does the neo-Davidsonian account of semantic theory require supplementation from an 
account of meaning in order to explain all of the linguistic phenomena?
27
 
 
We are presently assuming that the answer to (Q1) is “no”. So we can coarsely distinguish between 
Patterson’s inconsistency theory and cognitivism by their answers to (Q2). Patterson, it is clear, 
answers “no” to (Q2). The cognitivist, however, in seeking to claim that the cognised semantic theory 
is correct, is implicitly committed to answering “yes” to (Q2): if all linguistic phenomena can be 
explained without appeal to linguistic meaning, then it is difficult to see what motivation for 
cognitivism, or any other account of meaning, there could be. But the difficulty posed by the liar 
paradox and the answer to (Q2) are independent. One should not change their answer to (Q2) as a 
                                                          
27
 This question simplifies issues a little; I implicitly assume the explanations in question may appeal to other 
empirical claims, so long as those claims are construed so as not to imply anything about linguistic meaning. 
18 
 
response to the liar paradox. The explanatory power of the neo-Davidsonian account of semantic 
competence does not turn upon the consistency of the cognised semantic theory. Either the neo-
Davidsonian account requires supplementation from an account of meaning or it does not: if it does, 
then Patterson’s inconsistency theory is incorrect and should not be adopted; if it does not, then 
cognitivism is unmotivated and should be rejected for reasons independent of the liar paradox. Either 
way, it seems, Patterson’s inconsistency theory does not provide the cognitivist with a viable line of 
response to the difficulty posed by the liar paradox. 
 Let us, then, turn to Eklund’s inconsistency theory. Eklund suggests that the meaning of each 
term of a language consists of so-called “meaning-constitutive principles”. For a given term, 
possessing dispositions to accept the meaning-constitutive principles for that term is taken to be 
necessary and sufficient for semantic competence with it. Call such dispositions “competence 
dispositions”. So, for example, each instance of the principle: 
 
“‘…’ is true” and “…” are inter-deducible 
 
where “…” is replaced by a sentence of English, may be a meaning-constitutive principle for the 
English truth predicate. In particular, for Eklund, the following instance is a meaning-constitutive 
principle for the English truth predicate:  
 
(13) “‘λ is not true’ is true” and “λ is not true” are inter-deducible. 
 
Eklund thus claims that semantic competence with the truth predicate involves a disposition to accept 
(13). It does not matter for this story that some competence dispositions may be overridden (by, say, 
one’s knowledge that (13) leads straightforwardly to a contradiction). Semantic competence does not 
require one to accept (13) when faced with it: competence dispositions may be masked. 
 Eklund tells us that the semantic values of terms are fixed roughly as follows. 
 
When the conditions laid down by the meaning-constitutive principles can be satisfied, 
the semantic values are what satisfy them. When they cannot be, the semantic values are 
what come closest to satisfying them, provided any assignment of semantic values comes 
sufficiently close. (2005: 43) 
 
Here, which semantic values come closest to satisfying the meaning-constitutive principles is not just 
a matter of how many meaning-constitutive principles come out true; some of the principles may be 
more important than others, depending on, say, how deeply they are entrenched or how often the 
corresponding disposition is manifested. For more details, see Eklund 2002: 263–266. 
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 The cognitivist might adopt Eklund’s inconsistency theory by stipulating that the cognised 
semantic theory fixes the meaning-constitutive principles for the terms of the speaker’s language. The 
natural thought here is to identify the meaning-constitutive principles with the canonical theorems of 
the semantic theory. Then, the semantic values of terms of a language would be fixed as whatever 
assignment comes closest – in Eklund’s sense – to making the canonical theorems of the semantic 
theory come out true. 
 I have three brief concerns about adopting Eklund’s strategy in this way. First, it seems likely 
to yield quite significant semantic indeterminacy. It is well-known that semantic theories of the form 
we are discussing require more than truth in order to adequately pin down the meaning of terms. 
(There are difficulties, for example, distinguishing between the extensionally equivalent terms 
“renate” and “chordate”; and what will be the semantic value of abstract terms such as “justice”?) As 
the issue is well-known, I shall not expand upon it here.
28
  
 Second, it becomes unclear on this story what exactly is the point of positing linguistic 
meaning. For the cognitivist adopting Eklund’s inconsistency theory: the meaning of each term will 
likely be construed as consisting of the T-sentences in which the term is mentioned; and the semantic 
values of terms of the language would be fixed as whatever comes closest to making the relevant T-
sentences true. But it is unclear that the meaning, so construed, has any particular role to play in how 
we use language: it is the interpretation assigned by the cognised semantic theory, as opposed to 
whatever assignment comes closest to making the T-sentences true, which governs our linguistic 
behaviour. Moreover, it is not clear that Eklund’s notion of meaning has any normative import: for 
Eklund, if we change our competence dispositions then we simply cease to have semantic competence 
with the relevant terms. It is unclear what theoretical role Eklund’s notion of meaning would play.  
 Third, it is unclear that the cognitivist even can adopt Eklund’s inconsistency theory. Eklund 
relies on (13) being a meaning-constitutive principle. But principles such as (13) concern putative 
logical relations between sentences of English, whereas the canonical theorems of the cognised 
semantic theory (and T-sentences in particular) are most naturally construed as relating expressions of 
English to the world. To put the point more simply: (13) names two English sentences, whereas T-
sentences such as (Tλ) name one English sentence. The cognitivist should explain how (13) comes out 
as meaning-constitutive. 
 Perhaps the cognitivist can ameliorate these worries. But, at the very least, she would need to 
say a great deal more in order to adopt Eklund’s inconsistency theory. For now, however, let us turn 
to the third and final line of response: adopting a broadly Kripkean approach to the liar paradox. 
 In its simple form, cognitivism says that the cognised semantic theory is correct. But, perhaps, 
in light of the liar paradox, it is in fact a subtheory that is correct. There may be a class of T-sentences 
yielded by the cognised semantic theory that the cognitivist can isolate as pathological and then 
                                                          
28
 See e.g. Davidson 1976, 1977. 
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reject. A natural way to follow this line is to adopt a broadly Kripkean approach to the liar paradox.
29
 
The approach involves giving a recursive, partial definition of truth for a language whose pathological 
– or, better, ungrounded – sentences are deemed not to have truth values.30 At a very intuitive level, 
we can understand the ungrounded sentences as those that do not connect up with the world in the 
right way (whatever that is) to obtain a truth value. Crucially, on all formal accounts of groundedness, 
the liar sentence is an example of an ungrounded sentence.  
 The picture would be roughly as follows. First, when a sentence is grounded, its truth 
condition is that assigned by the cognised semantic theory. Second, when a sentence is ungrounded, it 
lacks a truth value and thus, presumably, it lacks a truth condition. However, the cognised semantic 
theory nonetheless yields a T-sentence for that sentence: consequently the T-sentence is incorrect (and 
the cognised semantic theory taken as a whole is incorrect). Third, in order to make sense of the 
compositionality of language, we would like to retain the axioms of the cognised semantic theory. 
However, we cannot simply deem the axioms correct, as we can derive from them the incorrect T-
sentences. Instead, the cognitivist might restrict the range of quantification in suitable axioms, 
deeming the restricted axiom set correct. I shall not discuss here how the cognitivist should perform 
the restriction, but assume for the sake of argument that it can be done. 
 There are, once again, difficulties facing this line of response.
31
 Consider first just 
metaphysical cognitivism. In taking this line, it would be natural for the metaphysical cognitivist to 
claim that the semantic module metaphysically determines the truth conditions of grounded sentences. 
However, this presupposes that there is already an established division between the grounded and 
ungrounded sentences. But groundedness, it seems, is to be determined in part by meaning and in part 
by the world. So, if “the sentence on the whiteboard is not true” is ungrounded, it is in part because it 
means that the sentence on the whiteboard is not true, and in part because the world is such that the 
(only) sentence on the whiteboard is “the sentence on the whiteboard is not true”. If this is right, then 
there must be a notion of meaning that is metaphysically prior to the truth conditions assigned by the 
semantic module. Let us call this thin-meaning.  
Now, I shall not say anything about what thin-meaning might amount to – this is a task for the 
metaphysical cognitivist adopting this line of response. But I note that, in order to maintain that the 
semantic module metaphysically determines meaning, the metaphysical cognitivist must explain how 
the semantic module metaphysically determines thin-meaning. This is unlikely to be an easy task: 
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 Kripke’s theory of truth is first introduced in his 1975. See Leitgeb 2005 for a similar, related view and 
discussion. 
30
 Some variants of the Kripkean approach to the liar paradox, such as Maudlin’s (2004), treat ungrounded 
sentences as possessing a third truth value, rather than as lacking a truth value. This issue need not concern us 
here. 
31
 There are additional difficulties, not discussed here, which I raise in Pinder forthcoming: §4. 
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semantic theories of the form we are considering assign to sentences only truth-conditional content. 
The metaphysical cognitivist who adopts this line of response would have to spell out a principled 
way to extract thin-meaning – whatever she says that it is – from a cognised semantic theory that only 
assigns truth-conditional content to sentences.  
 There is a more general version of the worry, which faces both metaphysical and material 
cognitivism. Which solution to the liar paradox is the correct solution (if indeed there is one) is, in 
part, a matter of linguistic meaning. We have considered solutions that deem the truth predicate to be 
context sensitive, that employ non-standard conditionals, and that treat meaning as (in some way) 
encoding inconsistency. On the Kripkean approach to the liar paradox, substantial hypotheses are 
offered about the extension of the truth predicate, the limited role of truth-conditional content, and a 
presumably semantic property of groundedness possessed by some sentences and not others. 
Ultimately, however, the cognitivist claims that linguistic meaning is determined by the cognitive 
mechanism that underpins semantic competence. But, on both the metaphysical and material varieties, 
we lack a clear picture of how those cognitive mechanisms determine the particular meanings that 
terms must have for a particular solution to the liar paradox to be correct. So, if the cognitivist claims 
that ungrounded sentences lack the truth-conditional content assigned to them by the semantic 
module, then this is a decision that she has made. It is a decision about the meaning of sentences 
which, as far as we can tell, is simply not reflected by the cognitive mechanism that underpins 
semantic competence. As such, on this line of response, linguistic meaning seems to outstrip the 
canonical theorems of the cognised semantic theory.  
 The upshot is this. If the cognitivist adopts the Kripkean approach to the liar paradox, then: 
some of the T-sentences yielded by the cognised semantic theory are incorrect, and there are aspects 
of linguistic meaning that are not reflected in the cognised semantic theory. Being cognised would 
thus be neither necessary, nor sufficient, for linguistic meaning.  
 To adopt the Kripkean approach to liar paradox, then, the cognitivist needs to say a great deal 
more. First, she would need to explain what role the semantic module plays in the metaphysical 
determination of linguistic meaning: does the semantic module metaphysically determine truth 
conditional content, and/or thin-meaning? If so, how? If not, what does? Second, she should provide 
an account of the epistemic relation between the so-determined linguistic meaning and semantic 
module; this may not be trivial because, as noted, there may be aspects of linguistic meaning that 
outstrip the cognised semantic theory. Third, she should explain why the Kripkean approach to the liar 
paradox is the correct approach. I make no claim that the cognitivist cannot fill in the details – but the 
details would most certainly need to be given. 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
The liar paradox poses a serious difficulty to the cognitivist account of meaning. There is evidence to 
suggest that, due to the paradox, the cognised semantic theory is inconsistent. This contradicts, on its 
natural construal, the cognitivist account of meaning. I have discussed a number of lines of response 
to the difficulty. Although they have not all been ruled out by our discussion, it is clear that a great 
deal of work would be required to show that any of them can overcome the difficulty.  
 An observation that has underpinned much of the discussion is this: the principal theoretical 
role of the cognised semantic theory gives us reason to think that the cognised semantic theory does 
not encode a solution to the liar paradox. I think that it is from this observation that the difficulties 
arise: if the cognised semantic theory does not encode a solution to the liar paradox, then there are 
likely to be problems using it to determine the correct semantic theory.   
 This observation, though, threatens to generalise. In particular, any account of meaning that 
ties the correct semantic theory too tightly to our linguistic dispositions or intuitions will, I think, face 
similar problems. The reason that the liar paradox is so difficult to solve is that there are individual 
claims or principles that we are disposed to treat as true, but that are jointly inconsistent. This is likely 
to be reflected in the cognitive and causal mechanisms that underpin those dispositions, and by our 
linguistic behaviour more generally. In light of the liar paradox, a great deal of care must be taken in 
giving, in terms such as these, an account of literal, linguistic meaning. 
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